

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

CI-55/51

6 March 1948

HEADQUARTERS  
7707 EUREPEAN COMMAND INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
AFG 757

CG AFM

COUNTERTERRORISM SPECIAL REPORT  
DIO Nos. 3154.0001; 3154.0002

Digest of Report

0448549

This report describes the organization and activities of Unternehmen (Operation) Zempel, ESRA intelligence unit formed in 1942 to train and employ PW Caucasians and Asiatics from the Soviet republics of central Asia as agents against the Soviet Government. Such agents were used to obtain essential elements of information about Russia's war industries, to spread anti-Bolshevik propaganda, to carry out sabotage missions, and to apprehend Russian agents. Units composed of these agents were also used in military operations on the Eastern Front.

The report also contains information about the organization and operation of Russian intelligence groups which were active in the areas bordering the Sea of Azov.

The particular attention of US counterintelligence agencies is called to Section 6 of this report.

The source of the information is Heinrich (Hoinz) ZEMER, former head of Hauptkommando Sud (Chief Command South), one of the major field units of Unternehmen Zempel.

Evaluation: C-2

CONTENTS

PAGE

BIOGRAPHY OF SOURCE  
REPORT

1. General Assignment Given to Unternehmen Zempel by the AGH 1
2. Chain of Command, Unternehmen Zempel 2
3. Screening and Selection by Unternehmen Zempel of Asiatic and Caucasian Agents 3
4. Training by Unternehmen Zempel of Asiatic and Caucasian Agents 4
5. Organization, Duties, and Activities of Hauptkommando Sud 5
6. Russian Intelligence and Sabotage Activities 8
7. Evaluation of Unternehmen Zempel Operations Against the Russians 9

BIOGRAPHY OF SOURCE

23 Jun 85

Born in ST. PETERSBURG, Russia, of German parents. Later attended school in ST. PETERSBURG.

1904-1910

Attended college; received law degree. Became an editor of the St. Petersburg Zeitung; cousin, Paul G. von HANCKE, editor in chief at the time.

1914-1923

Arrested as German subject, deported to ODONETS; escaped after Bolshevik revolution; went to ST. PETERSBURG; later became a member of German Central Committee for Repatriation of German PWs and Civil Internees; later appointed chief of a subcommittee at BUREAU. Returned to BERLIN and wrote articles against Communism; made chief of press department of anti-Bolshevik League.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES-METHODS EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2006

32-5-3

SECRET

6/61

1923-1929 Joined Munta, a camouflaged intelligence office of the German IIS, then under Col von BIELOW, and served as consultant on Eastern problems.

1930-1932 Joined NSBAP; worked in Prins. Center of SS Bruno Gut supplying intelligence about the East to higher German headquarters.

1933-1938 Transferred to Genter; sent to Glatzpo school for Erin Korte (police officials); assigned, on graduation, as chief of Amt III-D, NSBA (counterintelligence matters related to the USSR, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and the Far East). Made trips through Germany and Austria to interview police services of these countries.

1938 Appointed Director of Security Police.

1939 Appointed director of special courses for counterintelligence work at the School for Security Police and Security Service Officers.

1940-1943 Worked at Main Regional Office, Westaro, VIENNA. Later ordered to BERLIN to take part in Unternehmen Zeppelein.

1943 Appointed commandant of the Sonderkommando I at BERGHAUSEN. Later became 1st (int. affairs) officer of Hauptkommando Sonderkommando Unternehmen Zeppelein, and subsequently, chief of Hauptkommando Sued.

1944 Transferred to Amt VI-3, ESHA, to take charge of work on documents captured in Russia. Worked in same capacity at KARLSHOF in southeastern Austria.

May 1945 Arrested in Bavaria, while visiting family, taken to TRAUNSTEIN, and later interrogated by American officers.

#### REPORT

##### 1. General Assignment Given to Unternehmen Zeppelein by the ESHA

Unternehmen (Operation) Zeppelein, hereinafter referred to as UZ, is the name given to the organization and activities of an ESHA intelligence group assigned during the war to train and employ Russian PWs to obtain economic and political information about Russia. The UZ group was a unit of Amt VI\* of the ESHA, and transmitted its information to the highest echelon in BERLIN through Referat VI C 3\*\* of Amt VI. According to FRIEDRICH, the work carried out by the group was considered the most important intelligence operation on the Eastern Front.

The essential elements of information to be obtained by the UZ group concerned the status of the food supply within the USSR, possible increase in agricultural production by state farms and USSR potentials of the Soviet coal and petroleum industry, significant anti-Soviet movements within the USSR, and the best means of using anti-Soviet propaganda within the USSR.

\*Department VI of the Reich's government for higher and police security service. This department controlled the political intelligence service. In 1944, several of the department's units (in Germany) were training and using agents and special troops to carry out sabotage and subversion and sabotage in foreign countries.

\*\*Referat VI C 3, a section of Gruppe VI C of Amt VI, ESHA, compiled and evaluated information about Russia, Poland, and the Baltic States. Gruppe VI C of Amt VI handled all matters pertaining to the German and Japanese spheres of influence.

SECRET

SI-57/21

2. Chain of Command, Unternehmen Wotan

a. Central Administration, BERLIN, 1942

Amtsleiter, Amt VI, RSHA, BERLIN

Walter ~~WOLFF~~ ~~WOLFF~~

Chief of Central Administration  
Chief of Referat VI C 2, Amt VI

SS O/Stabsf. (Lt. Col.) ~~WOLFF~~;  
later, SS O/Stabsf. ~~WOLFF~~ ~~WOLFF~~

Intelligence Officer

H/Stab (Capt.) ~~WOLFF~~

Radio Communications Officer  
(In BERLIN, the UZ made use of  
the radio facilities of Amt VI)

SS Stabsf. (Maj.) ~~WOLFF~~

b. Field Administrative Units, 1942

Hauptkommando Nord (Chief Command North)  
Staff  
Oil Troop Unit (700 men)

Chief: SS Stabsf. ~~WOLFF~~

Military Unit of Hauptkommando  
Nord

Hauptkommando Sud (Chief Command South)  
Staff  
1 Troop Unit of Caucasians (200 men)  
1 Troop Unit of Asiatics (350 men)  
Training Camp BERYATSK

Chief: ~~WOLFF~~, later, ~~WOLFF~~;  
later, ~~WOLFF~~

c. Auxiliary or Cooperating Units

Industrial Interrogation Center, BERLIN-GATTE  
Central Camp for UZ Troops, KRAUSBERG, Silesia

Chief: Stabsf.  
~~WOLFF~~

Turkmen Training Camp (location not known)  
The Wannsee Institute of Referat VI C, Amt VI  
Stab WALLI\*, a unit under control of Admiral  
CANARIS

Chief: H/Stab ~~WOLFF~~  
Chief: ~~WOLFF~~ ~~WOLFF~~

\* The UZ military unit assigned to Oberkommando Nord, which was in operation in the area of PSKOV and later in the area of RIGA, was called the Oil Troop, after its leader, a Russian. Agents in this group were Russians who had expressed themselves as anti-Soviet, but had not been thoroughly investigated by the Germans. The Germans suspected that some had volunteered merely to obtain the large sums of money which the Germans usually gave agents when they were about to commit. Later, a number turned out to be Russian agents or provocateurs. These murdered their German leaders and stole their money. A number of these Russian officers and NKVD men offered to murder important Russian commissars. Their offers were taken seriously, large sums of money being given them to accomplish their missions. However, nothing ever really came of these missions.

\*\* Stab WALLI and UZ exchanged information about identification papers and documents, such as passes for foreigners, military passes, and membership cards for Communists and Komsomol members. However, the two units duplicated each other's work. There was no real integration of their work and no specific provision was ever made to have the units inform each other of the latest developments with respect to intelligence obtained about Russia.

SECRET

# BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

CI-55/51

## 3. Screening and Selection by Unternehmen Zoonelin of Asiatic and Caucasian Agents

At the time UZ became an organization, Russian PWs to be used as agents were taken from a number of PW camps and sent to the Central UZ prisoners in KREUZBERG, Silesia. The future personnel of Unternehmende, one of the field units, was drawn from PWs who came from the territories of Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. Russian PWs who were knowledgeable concerning essential elements of information but who were unsuitable for use as agents were sent to the UZ interrogation camp (Sonderlager T) at BRESLAU-OSWITZ. These latter were usually technicians, engineers, scientists, etc.

Of the many PWs originally selected for UZ, very few were suitable for agent work, principally because the Soviet authorities had already weeded out the anti-Communist intelligentsia, leaving only anti-Communists who were illiterate.

## 4. Training by Unternehmen Zoonelin of Asiatic and Caucasian Agents

### a. Training by Central Administration of UZ, BERLIN

The basic training of Caucasians and Asiatics as agents of UZ was often carried out without regard to a real system or set of principles. Some of the camp commanders treated their men in a very military manner, while other camp commanders paid little attention to military discipline and laid more stress on personal hygiene. In general, PW training from the Soviet republics of Central Asia were given military drill, ideological lectures, and were sometimes permitted to listen to news broadcasts in German from the Berlin radio stations. Many of the trainees could not understand a word of German, and it was the exception rather than the rule for PW trainees to hear their own language used in a news broadcast from BERLIN.

FEMER states that German attempts to make National Socialists out of the Turkmen were ridiculous. However, he did everything in his power to arouse in them a feeling of nationalism by teaching them to be proud of their past history and by inciting them against the USSR, pointing out to them that although the present Soviet Government had relieved them of some of the burdens imposed upon them by the Tsarist Government, the Soviet Government would never grant complete independence to the republics of Central Asia. It was also pointed out to the Turkmen that the Turkmen intelligentsia had been liquidated or exiled whenever it was discovered that they advocated complete independence for the Turkmen Republic, and that the languages spoken in the republics of Central Asia had been Russianized to the extent of substituting Cyrillic letters for the Latin letters.

A training feature regarded by FEMER as very effective was the sending to BERLIN of groups of twenty to thirty PWs from the republics of Central Asia to show them the glories of the city and to impress upon them that Allied bombing was ineffectual. These men were taken on guided tours and shown the mosque in BERLIN. Although many of them were indifferent to the religious significance of the mosque, all of them were impressed.

\* According to information contained in Appendix B, FR 31, CODIC (WEA) PAGE, dated 21 January 1946, "the dept of Gruppe VI C which from the end of 1942 onwards became known as Unternehmende Zoonelin gradually evolved from the 'Russian organisation' of the Gruppe, and dealt exclusively with interrogation and selection of Russian PW volunteers, with a view to employing them as agents in the front-line operations."

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

01-52/61

At the conclusion of each trip, convivial parties were given by the leading personalities of the Central Administration of UZ for the immigrant personages of the nationalities represented by the visiting group of PWs. One of these meetings, there were present a number of members of the National Independence Committee, including Abil KAZHIGALI, the leader of the Committee and a close collaborator of Ernst KAMBE, of the German Eastern Front. Speeches were made in the German and Russian languages. However, only the PWs from Kazakhstan and Tadjikistan were able to understand German or Russian.

The same general procedure was followed for other groups, including Georgians, who were brought to BERLIN. The Georgians, particularly, enjoyed the favor of the RSHA, as many had previously moved from PARIS to BERLIN, hoping that by cooperating with the Germans they might eventually win independence for Georgia. Among the leading Georgians living in BERLIN and helping the Germans were ASDIA and NOCHETELI, the last-named having at one time been ambassador to BERLIN of the Independent Republic of Georgia.

As an aid to training PWs from the republics of Central Asia and other areas of Russia, publications and articles containing propaganda, which were issued by the various committees for independent republics of Central Asia, were distributed to the various camps and advance units of the UZ. Some of these publications proved of inestimable value, especially those which assumed conditions within the various territories of the USSR from a nationalist point of view. Among such papers were two Turkmen journals, one Georgian, one Armenian, one Azerbaïdzhanian, and one for the small minorities in the northern Caucasus.

The journals showed that the USSR had taken every precaution to avoid a possible awakening of nationalist feeling in any of the territories under its control. In particular, the journals stressed that the USSR had fostered the various languages of the minorities to make sure that there would be no common language among them. In connection with this, the German Government first used the literary language common to the entire area in Central Asia. Later, it used the language particular to any area where minorities were settled. This general procedure was taken on the assumption that because of the efforts of the Soviet Government, many of the minorities had drifted away from use of the common literary language. However, the German Government printed all its pamphlets in Latin letters, not in Cyrillic.

Although the younger generation of PWs from the republics of Central Asia were indifferent to attempts to create a Pan-Islam movement--in fact many of those from Kazakhstan belonged to the Bostondzhiki (League of Athletes in Russia) -- all of them seemed anxious to fight against the Soviet Government. FETZER notes that of the 350 Asiatics under his command, only 25 observed the religious teachings of Islam. However, among all the Mohammedans there was evidence of a common religious bond.

In connection with its efforts to arouse these PWs by making use of their religious feelings, UZ stressed that the German Army was reopening the mosques in those areas of the USSR which it had conquered. UZ pointed out the similar action by the Red Army was taken mainly for the propaganda value in foreign countries, particularly in Allied countries. It also pointed out that the Soviet Government had recognized in religion a vital force which could be made use of in the fight against Germany.

FETZER is of the belief that had the end of the war not come so quickly Germany would have won for itself a number of Mohammedans to act as agents for fomenting unrest among the Mohammedan groups within the USSR. Time was of the essence, and Germany did not have enough time to recruit and train such agents.

b. Training of Asiatic Agents at Sonderlager E. BERGLAND-OSWITZ

While commandant at Sonderlager E. BERGLAND-OSWITZ, FETZER trained PWs from the republics of Central Asia to the small arms, dynamite, and W/T apparatus. The PWs were given courses in the German language and in the ancient and

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

SECRET

CI-SR/61

modern history of their countries. They were indoctrinated with anti-Communist ideas, and it was made clear to them that development of their own countries would be possible only after Bolshevism had been wiped out.

FERNER permitted his PW trainees two leaves a week from camp, feeling that this would strengthen their trust in German leaders. At the same time, he knew that such leaves jeopardized the security of UZ operations. In some instances, such leaves resulted in a higher venereal disease rate among the trainees.

#### 5. Organization, Duties, and Activities of Hauptkommando Sued

##### a. Organization

Hauptkommando Sued was organized in March 1943 under command of SS Sturmfuhrer ROFLER and was established in BERDYANSK shortly thereafter. In October 1943, the organization was moved to VOSNESENK, in December 1943 to ODESSA, and later, shortly before the Russians recaptured ODESSA, to PRZEMSL, Poland.

The chief component units of Hauptkommando Sued in 1943 and 1944 were as follows: a main command unit and suboffice command units. The components of the main command unit were an administrative and housing section, an intelligence section, a radio unit, a documents section, outpost units, two military units, and groups of agents. The main command unit retained the title Hauptkommando Sued. The suboffice units were located in the area of the immediate front, at KILEROV, STALINO, SLAVYANSKAYA, TAGANROG, SINZIS, and KHERCH. An advanced outpost or suboffice was stationed at KRYVSKAYA, on the Kuba Peninsula. All the suboffices were organized like the main unit, only less completely and on a smaller scale.

##### b. Duties and Activities

Respective components of Hauptkommando Sued undertook the following duties and activities:

##### (1) Administrative and Economic Section

The administrative and economic section fed and housed the staff of Oberkommando Sued and the military units attached to it, and clothed and armed various UZ units which were committed by Oberkommando Sued.

##### (2) Operations Section

The Operations section planned the commitment of Georgians and other Caucasian groups.

Operatives for the Caucasian area generally were sent to the vicinity of TIFLIS and KUTAISS, Georgia. Some agents were also flown to northern Caucasus where known anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik peoples or groups lived. Attempts were made to contact Mohammedan groups in the Caucasus, and for this purpose prisoners from the regions of Karachi, Dagestan, Azerbaidzhan, and Chechnya were available as agents. The members of the Mohammedan groups were poor sources of information, but excellent at making propaganda and in fomenting trouble or organizing partisan groups.

##### (3) Intelligence Section

The intelligence section was in charge of counterintelligence work, made propaganda, carried out the ideological training of agents to be committed, planned and organized the commitment of liaison from the republics of Middle Asia, and maintained intelligence liaison with German Army Groups South and A until ordered by Central Administration, UZ, to desist from doing this last-mentioned service. The section also maintained liaison with naval intelligence units stationed at KARTUPOLE and ODESSA.

Information obtained from field agents was condensed into reports which were sent weekly by plane or courier to Central Administration, UZ, BERLIN.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

11-37/61

The more important information was radioed directly to the FSB in KIEV. General intelligence reports were also sent to the intelligence officers of the Army Group Northern Ukraine and Army Group Southern Ukraine.

Before sending off on a long-range action, the intelligence section treated them especially well. Small festive parties were organized for the agents, during which they were decorated with the East Medal especially struck off for such volunteers. FETTER usually accompanied his agents by plane from BERDYANSK to TAGANROG, and started with them at TAGANROG after handling the Korane. The agents were then flown on to the point from over which they were to parachute down.

Each agent group usually consisted of four to five men, one of whom was a W/T operator. The men were allowed to choose their own group leaders. In groups assigned important missions, there were two W/T operators. Each group had specific instructions, and some of the groups took along large quantities of propaganda material, generally thousands of pamphlets or magazines which had been published in BERLIN by the National Committee of United Ukrainians.

The intelligence section sent several groups of agents to the area of the estuary of the Ural River. Other groups were flown to the region near the mouth of the Dnieper River, about thirty miles east of KIEV. All these groups were told to reach the naphtha district of the East. Some of the groups were ordered to cut the pipeline which ran north from the Caspian Sea to the naphtha districts. For security reasons, these last were dropped by plane at a considerable distance from the districts in which they were to operate. All of the groups maintained contact by wireless, some for many months. Some groups reported propaganda successes. Other groups established relations with persons of influence in SUIAFAT and TASHKENT. But the sabotage groups were not able to damage the pipeline during the period in which FETTER was intelligence officer. In general, the information which these groups sent by wireless to FETTER was of no great value.

FETTER states that the security of his missions was often jeopardized because plane transportation was looking for agents who were waiting to leave on a mission. The agents became nervous and mistrustful. In one particular case, a group of Georgian agents were forced to wait for several weeks before a plane became available to transport them to their place of commitment. During this time, the men were often drunk, and FETTER believes that Soviet agents successfully approached them and obtained information about the undertaking. He also learned that one Georgian, becoming impatient with the delay, had proposed to a comrade that the two betray the group to the Soviets after the place of commitment had been reached.

To aid him in security work, FETTER bribed some fishermen of BERDYANSK with liquor and tobacco to act as informants. The fishermen, Ukrainian and supposedly anti-Soviet, reported that at YUISK, on the eastern side of the Sea of Azov, they had been approached by Russian intelligence men whom they recognized as former members of the FSB and had been ordered to tell exactly what German and Romanian units were in BERDYANSK. As soon as FETTER obtained corroboration of the presence of a Russian intelligence unit at YUISK, he became convinced that a major Russian move would be made against BERDYANSK. After checking his information and comparing it with those of the nearest counterintelligence unit of the German Army, FETTER then informed the commandant at BERDYANSK to be particularly watchful for increasing counterintelligence and sabotage activity on the part of the Russians.

FETTER's maintenance of liaison with army intelligence bore a great deal of fruit until the Central Administration of Unternehmen Zempel ordered him to stop. For instance, the secret orders given to a Soviet armored column fell into the hands of an outpost unit of FETTER. The information therein was immediately passed on to the intelligence officers of German Army Groups A and South. In return, officers of these units informed Hauptkommando South of resistance movements in Dagestan and north of Georgia, which could be utilized by Hauptkommando South.

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

CI-85/61

Hauptkommando Sued also cooperated with naval intelligence units at HARTFORD and ODESSA. The work of the naval intelligence unit at ODESSA paralleled that of Hauptkommando Sued, although on a smaller scale recruiting communications agents by plane. However, the naval unit funneled more agents through the lines.

(4) Radio Unit

The radio unit trained V/T operators for use with agent groups and equipped these groups with V/T sets. The unit also maintained communications with groups in the field and with the Central Administration of Unternehmen Zerkell at BERLIN.

(5) Documents Section

The documents section forged Soviet identification papers for use by agents of Oberkommando Sued. Some of the best men, Amt VI, RSHA, were placed at the disposal of Unternehmen Zerkell for forging Russian identification papers. Former Soviet officers who professed hatred of the Soviet Government were also employed in this work. Captured documents, often in badly damaged state, were successfully counterfeited, large numbers of Russian stamps were made, and paper of the same quality and color as that used by the Russians was obtained. As a rule, it was easy to match the paper used on genuine Russian identification papers as the scarcity of paper in Russia had led to use by the Russians of almost any kind of paper. However, some Russian identification papers and documents were printed on excellent paper, in which case the Reich Printing Service was able to supply similar paper for use by the documents section.

Once, Hauptkommando Sued captured an entire set of secret documents belonging to a Russian division, containing instructions for verifying and checking identification papers and showing the precise places where entries were to be made on soldiers' passes. Some of the agents of Hauptkommando Sued were able to report that identification papers issued on the basis of the information contained in the captured documents had been checked repeatedly by Soviet specialists and had not been detected.

Whenever information about changes in Soviet systems of identification was obtained, Hauptkommando Sued immediately reported this to Amt VI, RSHA.

(6) Military Units

Under Oberkommando Sued there were two military units made up of men considered unsuitable for use as agents. One group numbering about 350 Asiatics was used for a time to guard the immediate vicinity of the ARDYANSK camp. This unit and the other military unit, consisting of about 200 Georgians, were used in the lines. The groups were also helpful in capturing Soviet saboteur agents. In combat, the Asiatics were excellent, unlike the Georgians.

In general, FEHLEB was always against making these two units an integral part of Unternehmen Zerkell, and he finally succeeded in convincing his superiors that his point of view was right.

6. Russian Intelligence and Sabotage Activities

After Hauptkommando Sued undertook operations on the Eastern Front, it became apparent that Russian intelligence and sabotage activities kept increasing. Russian agents were parachuted almost nightly into the ARDYANSK region. Within one period of ten days, seven groups of five men each were dropped behind the German lines. However, with the help of the Ukrainian police or UZ military units, twenty-five of these agents were captured by Hauptkommando Sued.

Hauptkommando Sued learned that Russian intelligence headquarters at YEISK had been assigned to cover an area equal to that occupied by German army or army group at most. This was much smaller than the area covered by Hauptkommando Sued. FEHLEB interrogated the captured agents and learned the

# BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SI-82/61

a. The mission given to the agents was primarily sabotage, including destruction of railroad track, overpasses, underpasses, etc. Obtaining information was of secondary importance, and this information was limited to German troop movements, arrival of reinforcements from Germany, and the appearance of anti-German partisan groups. (At this time, the population in the Southern Ukraine was anti-Bolshevik, a condition which did not prevail later.)

b. The Russians operated on the principle that the larger the numbers committed, the more likely the chances of success. Of the persons committed by the Russians, many were forced to accept the assignment. Some had been jailed on suspicion of being pro-German or unfaithful to the Fatherland and had been released only on their promise to redeem themselves by volunteering for such a mission. Others had made defeatist remarks. Others had come from concentration camps in Russia. Others were natives of the Ukraine, had been forced to volunteer, but had determined not to act against the Germans.

c. As a rule, except for the leader of any group of Russian agents, none of the members knew any details about the mission nor had received any training, equipment, or money. Few carried weapons. Most had no identification papers whatsoever, although it was later discovered that the leader of the group had been given local identification papers to hand over to each member of his group after the group had reached its place of commitment. Almost all the agents were dressed in civilian clothing of poor quality, in contrast to the quality of clothing given by the Germans to their agents before committing them to an area. (Later, the Germans provided their agents with the kind of clothing worn by the residents of the district or area to which the agents were to be sent.)

FELTZER also learned that Russian agents were kept incommunicado after being assigned a mission and before being sent off on the mission. For food, Russian agents were usually given some bread and bacon, nothing more. They were expected to live off the land.

d. The leader of any group was usually a Communist who knew all details connected with the mission, had been well trained, and had been given information concerning his line of withdrawal, including passwords necessary to get back through the front lines. As a rule, the leader was the only one who could operate the group's W/T set. The leader was also the only one who carried a map, a compass, a watch, and money, the last usually being a small sum, in contrast to the amounts which the Germans gave to their agents. (FELTZER states that one group of Asiatics sent out by Unternehmen Zerkow carried over a million rubles to cover any contingency. The Germans also always took into account black market conditions in any area where their agents were to operate.)

FELTZER learned that the Russian agents sent messages not in code but using pre-arranged phrases. For instance, "bright sunshine" indicated that the group had landed safely and that all was well.

## 7. Evaluation of UZ Operations Against the Russians

FELTZER states that Unternehmen Zerkow fell far short of its hoped for success for the following reasons:

a. The higher officials of UZ had no real knowledge of Russia and its problems. For instance, many of the officials refused to understand that the people might not revolt against the Soviet Government and failed to take this into account when planning operations.

b. UZ was never able to maintain good security. For instance, its Asiatic agents were often held up from going on their missions because planes were lacking. These agents were permitted leave while waiting for transportation on a mission. Some became drunk and divulged to Russian agents, it is believed by FELTZER, the nature of their mission. Others contracted venereal diseases, forcing the Germans to re-arrange plans and personnel commitments.

c. The Germans assigned to lead the groups of Asiatics and other Russian nationals were not fit to do so. Some of the chief German agents treated the Asiatics as inferiors and thus lowered the morale of the group.

SECRET

GI-44/61

d. Too much time was spent in discussing and making fantastic plans to destroy all Russian war industries in the Urals.

e. German planes could not fly the vast distances often required for success of a mission, nor could the planes reach targets in the interior of Russia.

f. The value of anti-Russian propaganda carried on by having the agents distribute pamphlets, etc. was in direct ratio to German military success.

g. The units of UZ and German HHS units failed to cooperate. For instance, the military governor at BEREZANSK was very uncooperative. In another case, Hauptmann Gued was ordered to cease exchange of information with certain Army units.

For the Commanding Officer:

ARNOLD H. SILVER  
DACE Desk V